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I. 
THE following notes are prompted by the belief that in d l  aesthetic 
discussion, and psychological experiment in conncxion with the subject 
of aesthetics, too little attention is paid to  the questioii of the direct 
action on the mind of the medium itsc!f. Ry ‘medium’ is understood 
the tools and materials employed in the particular art concerned. 
A few simple illustrations may make this clearer. Let us take a 
symbol with which everybody is familiar, particularly since its mournful 
application in the late war: the cross. As carried out in wood, that is 
to  say in the form of two crossed sticks or planks, apart from any 
religious meaning that  i t  conveys most people find the symbol aes thetically 
satisfactory if the proportions are reasonably good. But, carried out in 
stone, in the same form and proportions, the symbol becomes unsatis- 
factory. It seems to need modification. I n  practice the modification is 
generally made. The most popular forms of the cross in stone are either 
the Celtic, or ‘wheel,’ cross, or else the tall form, common in village 
crosses, in which the shaft is greatly elongated and generally tapering 
from the base, and the arms are reduced to comparative insignificance. 
The reason seems to  me quite simple. In  the wooden form, whether 
the two sticks or planks are mortised or merely nailed together, the 
grain of the wood, though i t  may not be perceptible to the eye, is felt 
to  run horizontally across the arms. The wooden cross explains itself as 
a structure. Repeated in stone the same form does not explain itself. 
Since it is inconceivable that the grain of the stone can run vertically 
in the shaft and horizontally in the arms, the impression given is that 
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the cross has been punched out of the stone in an arbitrary manner in 
disregard of its nature and substance. Not only that, but the impression 
conveyed is that of actual weakness at the crossing of the shaft and 
arms. In  addition there is the sense of difficulty in workmanship; that 
it must have cost an amount of labour disproportionate to  the result 
achieved to  cut the stone to  the lateral depth necessary for the pro- 
jection of the arms to that, extent. As I said, in practice the feeling of 
discrepancy with regard to  the grain, the effect of weakness at the 
crossing, and the sense of disproportionate labour are all generally 
avoided by certain modifications. In  the Celtic cross an amount of stone 
is left, in the shape of the ‘wheel,’ which not only strengthens the 
structure but, so to  speak, contradicts the method of construction 
employed in wood, and actually lessens the labour; and in the tall cross 
the same results are obtained by evasion; by making much of the shaft 
and little of the arms. When and why these modifications were adopted 
in translating the wooden cross into stnne it is impossible to  say; but 
I am persuaded that they were prompted by aesthetic instinct having 
regard to the nature of stone. If it be objected that the reason was 
practical, my answer is that practical and aesthetic reasons are at 
bottom the same thing; or, to put i t  another way, that aesthetic appre- 
ciation is dependent upon the sense, which may not be conscious, of 
practical problems effectively solved. However, for the moment, the 
important point is that here we have a simple form and proportion 
which is satisfactory in one material and unsatisfactory in another. 
Now let us take an illustration from architecture. It would be quite 
possible, I suppose, to build a Parthenon of the same scale and proportion 
in brick; but I do not think that the result would be satisfactory. 
Whether or not Doric architecture originated in the imitation of wooden 
structures, it is obviously a style adapted to  construction with stones 
which share with timber the character of length. Whatever it is or is 
not, classical architecture is essentially a style of building with long 
stones. For satisfactory translation into brick i t  involves the modifica- 
tions implied in Renaissance, represented in England by Tudor and Queen 
Anne. Here again we have a form which, for aesthetic reasons based 
upon practical convenience, is satisfactory in one material and un- 
satisfactory in another. 
Or, again, we might take an illustration from the printed page, and 
one which carries the argument a little further because i t  transfers the 
attention from the materials used to the act of using them. Nobody 
can look a t  an illuminated manuscript without feeling that  the character 
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employed is well adapted to  the act of writing. You can see the formation 
of the letters with the pen or brush. With the introduction of wood- 
engraving, which is the link between writing and printing, this fitness of 
the character becomes less evident. You can still follow in sympathy 
the movements of the engraver’s hand in cutting the type, but the form 
of the character seems too elaborate for the method. With the intro- 
duction of printing from movable type, or typography proper, the 
unfitness of the character for casting positively jumps at you; and, in 
fact, with the advance of printing the Gothic character was generally 
abandoned in favour of Roman, which was probably an engraved or 
incised character before it was a written one. 
Thus, in the transition from writing to printing, the form of the 
character was modified and even changed out of regard for the materials 
and the convenience of the hand in using them. The same symbols were 
employed, and with exactly the same meaning; but they were adapted 
to the changed methods in book production. Not only that, but our 
aesthetic pleasure in the written or printed page depends a good deal 
on this fact. Minor variations in form and irregularities in arrangement 
which add beauty and interest to the written page, because they suggest 
the movement and convenience of the hand, have no meaning in the 
printed page. Instead of an aesthetic merit they become an aesthetic 
defect; though the purpose of the text, to convey meaning, remains 
exactly the same. Apart from the strain it puts upon the eyes, the 
Gothic type of a German newspaper oflends the aesthetic sense because 
it looks ill-adapted to  the methods of printing as it was not t o  formation 
with the pen or brush. 
The above illustrations have the advantage of not being complicated 
with any question of likeness to nature. They show, or seem to show, 
that even in the more abstract conditions of art we cannot consider 
form apart from the means by which it is produced. When we turn to 
the arts of representation we find exactly the same thing. For our full 
aesthetic satisfaction, any form of nature must be adapted to  the material 
in which it is represented and to the convenience of the hand in using 
that material. Thus, we expect a broader treatment of landscape in 
water-colour than in oils because the, so to speak, ‘natural’ play of 
water-colour is in broad washes. Or, to take extreme illustrations, 
stained-glass, mosaic, tapestry and embroidery obviously do not lend 
themselves with ease to such close imitation of nature as either oil or 
water-colours. The same natural forms may,be represented in all these 
materials; but in each case there are modifications determined by the 
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convenient use of the material concerned. Jn a note to  his Lectures on 
Architecture and Painting delivered a t  Edinburgh, November, 1853, 
Ruskin put this commonplace of art, as it might be called, into the 
follon-ing words: “ In  every branch of art, only so much imitation of 
nature is t o  be admitted as is consistent with the ease of the workman 
and the capacities of the material.” 
M i d  and Mectizirm in Art 
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The question, from a psychological point of view, is how far our 
enjoyment of a work of art is dependent upon this adaptation of means 
to end; whether, in fact, Ruskin’s axiom is an arbitrary aesthetic rule 
or a commonplwe of human psychology. Personally, as I have tried 
to show, I believe that the dependence is much greater and much closer 
than is commonly supposed, and that in itself it affords the most pro- 
niisjng guide to  both artistic education and psychological experiment. 
The objection that we can enjny n-orks nf art without knowing how 
they are done, and that in moments of highest aesthetic enjoyment we 
become unconscious of the means, is only apparent. Directly the means 
are used out of character we do become conscious of them, whether we 
understand their characteristic use or not; as is implied in the old saying 
ars est celare artem. 
Nor does unconsciousness of the means seem to depend on likeness 
to nature in the sense of imitation-as the old saying is commonly 
interpreted. A very wide departure from nature is accepted by the 
simplest intelligence so long as the means are used in character. Leaving 
out such crude exakples as the child’s wooden horse or Dutch doll, the 
outline drawing is a case in point. It does not really resemble what i t  
represents, but i t  presents no difficulty to the mind because it explains 
itself by the means adopted: the pointed pencil. The same is true of 
every form of art in which the means are obvious; such as stained-glass 
or mosaic. Paradoxical as i t  may sound, the means are ignored in pro- 
portion as they are obvious. It is when the means are of a kind to  allow 
t’he artist to “play the game of art closely up to  the real aspects of 
nature,” as in painting, that difficulties begin and the true meaning of 
ars est celare artem is confused with the question of likeness to  nature 
in the sense of imitation. The same person who will swallow an Egyptian 
papyrus will jib at an Impressionist painting. He says it looks ‘painty.’ 
The reason seems to  me quite simple. In  the papyrus the means though 
perfectly obvious are ignored because they are used in character; in the 
Impressionist painting they are obtruded because, to  a certain extent, 
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they are used out of character. To a certain extent they are used to 
create optical illusion; they do not seem entirely “consistent with the 
ease of the workman and the capacities of the material.” 
This habit of the human mind of straining a t  gnats and swallowing 
camels in the use of materials seems to me to throw light upon the very 
nature of ar t  and of artistic appreciation. Broadly speaking there are 
two views of art as commonly held : that  it is primarily the representation 
of nature, and that it is primarily the direct action of abstract form 
colour and proportion or, in general terms, of design. Both views assume 
the transference of emotion as the aim of art, and each allows for the 
other as an aid to  that purpose; but neither takes much account of the 
direct, action of the medium in the process. 
The suggestion that I would put forward is that art is primarily the 
characteristic use of materials, and that the representation of nature 
and the direct action of design are both incidental to  that. They may 
or may not be present in the particular art concerned. So far from 
denying either, this view provides the connecting link or the reconciling 
factor between them. I n  this view the transference of emotion is looked 
upon as a consequence rather than an aim, and aesthetic appreciation 
as mainly a sympathetic response, not necessarily conscious, t o  the 
characteristic use of tools and materials. 
That this view ignores any distinction between art and craft may 
be cheerfully admitted. The distinction may exist, but most of the 
troubles of art, including the separation of art from life, to  the disad- 
vantage of both, are due to  the various attempts to  fix it arbitrarily. 
For our purpose it is enough to  say that  craft is a necessary condition 
of art, and that  the nature of art and of aesthetic appreciation can be 
studied profitably only in that condition. I have the tantalising con- 
viction that the whole aesthetic problem is stated in thc Athanasian 
Creed-if we could only work it out! At any rate we can say that art 
is neither made nor begotten but proceeding from craftsmanship in 
relation to  the subject or idea. Or, to  put it another way, the relation 
between art and craft may be not unlike that suggested by William 
James,in Human Immortality,as existing between thought and the braiv. 
That is to say, that the function of craft is not creative but transmissive 
or, if you like to  put it that  way, limiting. This would account for the 
fact that there are plenty of people with a high degree of aesthetic 
sensibility, and even ‘creative ideas,’ but no sign of artistic talent. 
They lack the limiting capacity of craftsmanship which is the necessary 
condition of art. It would also account for the fact that  though art is 
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Proni the human point of view the last two advantages are by far 
the most important. So long as art is regarded as primarily the repre- 
sentation of nature, or as primarily the direct action of design, it is 
bound to be regarded as a special subject. The difficulty is to  get the 
ordinary person to carry into aesthetic regions the perception and judg- 
ment that he displays in the other departments of life. He will persist 
in thinking of art as a mystery complicated by arbitraty rules of taste; 
and the consequence is that he chooses his clothes and pursues his 
hobbies on sound aesthetic principles, so far as they go, and takes his art 
and literature on trust. It is a fact that  the pictures in an average home 
are as a rule less good artistically than the carpets and curtains, and the 
domestic reading is less good literature than the letters and conversation. 
I am not proposing anything new-indeed it is the oldest view of art- 
but only that the subject of art and literature should be approached 
from a fresh angle. Once accustom a man t o  the idea that  ar t  is primarily 
the characteristic use of tools and materials in view of the particular 
purpose, and you have given him a clue to  the highest aesthetic apprecia- 
tion. Whatever art may be, essentially, in the last analysis all aesthetic 
virtues are virtues of necessity. The laws of painting are as surely derived 
from the nature of paint and brushes as the laws of cricket are derived 
from the nature of bat and ball. Any man who has handled a tool in 
a hobby or an implement in a game is on the way to  understanding art 
in its highest developments. The purpose may be different, but the 
principles are the same. The advantages of this approach to  the subject 
do not, however, end with aesthetic appreciation. They reflect backwards 
upon work and play. The first-hand knowledge and judgment derived 
from work, of whatever kind, are carried into the aesthetic region, and 
the refinements of art are instinctively applied t o  work ; so that sweeping 
a floor becomes an artistic exercise. 
All art is, finally, nature, but nature in the larger sense defined by 
Reynolds in his Seventh Discourse. “My notion of nature comprehends 
not only the forms which nature produces, but also the nature and 
internal fabric and organisation, as I may call it, of the human mind 
and imagination.” If to  these words we add “and the nature of the 
tools and materials used by man,” it seems to  me that  we have a con- 
ception of art that will cover all its practices and, a t  any rate potentially, 
explain all its phenomena. 
